FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
1. How do we find our “course link” for logging on to the Zoom class?
All OLLI members (which includes those enrolled for Fall courses) should have received an email newsletter from OLLI with instructions for finding their course links in the “Student Portal.” It explained that “if any of your students ask, please direct them to https://olliatduke.online for those instructions and other related information.”
Essentially, OLLI members who register for Fall term courses will find the Zoom links in their “Learnmore Student Portal,” which is the same website used for course registration. The link for each course will remain the same for every session of your course. https://learnmore.duke.edu/front
Again, directions on how to use the link above can be found here: https://www.olliatduke.online/studentlink.html
2. In addition to PDF copies of the Levinas readings, I noticed on this website you provide a link to a free online version of Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Yet, you also state that you “strongly suggest” that we purchase the edition translated by Walter Kaufmann. Why? If we choose to use a different translation or an online version, will we have trouble following along and participating in class discussions?
I have always felt that translations are as much an “artform” as a “science.” Hence, I recommended purchasing the Kaufmann edition of the Nietzsche text, versus simply reading the older, free online translation, because I find it more accessible, easier to understand, and less prone to misinterpretation. Nevertheless, feel free to look at the free online version first, or any alternative translation that you prefer, before you make any purchase. Obviously, if you find another version easy to read, comprehend, etc., then you are more than welcome to use it.
Please Note: Although I will be using the page numbers from the Kaufmann edition, I also have listed the section numbers of the text so you can follow along regardless of the translation you choose.
For example, the first reading assignment is On the Genealogy of Morals, 15-23; 24-27, 33-46 [Preface: 1-8; 1st Essay: 1-3, 7-13].
The page numbers refer only to the Kaufman edition. This means that those who own the Kaufmann edition will be reading pages 15-23; 24-27; 33-46. I also intentionally provided the section references so you can use any version of the text. Regardless of your version, in this example everyone will be reading the following sections of the text in ALL EDITIONS: Preface: 1-8; 1st Essay: 1-3, 7-13. Hence, the sections are identical in all versions, but the page numbers only apply to the Kaufmann edition.
Finally, the “questions to consider as you read in preparation for class discussion” are intended to help you focus your analysis of the texts in preparation for our next class. Alternatively, if you prefer, you may bring to class any particular passages you encounter that you find compelling or thought provoking for us to discuss. This is your class, so I am always open to hearing your thoughts and insights about the readings!
3. I have been told that Friedrich Nietzsche was a very prolific writer. What books did he publish?
In 1872, Nietzsche published his first book, The Birth of Tragedy. Between 1873 and 1876, he published four separate long essays which later appeared in a collected edition under the title Untimely Meditations. In 1878, he published Human, All Too Human. Although his health began to decline, he continued to work as an independent philosopher and published one book or section of a book each year until 1888 (completing five that year alone). His published works are listed chronologically below:
WORKS
4) In class there was an extended discussion/debate regarding Nietzsche’s understanding of “ressentiment,” his conception of slave vs. noble morality, and whether examples of “noble morality” existed in the modern world. Can you briefly clarify your understanding of Nietzsche’s position?
The backdrop to our class discussion was Nietzsche’s distinction between master and slave morality. We began by establishing the “aristocratic/knightly/noble” morality of the powerful minority [the “superalives”] (I.7-9). Their “value judgements presuppose a powerful physicality, a flourishing…” abundant health and that which preserves it, and “all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity” (Kaufmann 33). They find complete contentment and satisfaction through the mere exercising of one’s power and strength. Nietzsche believes that this type of person stands as an exemplar to the rest of humanity. He categorizes these people as the “superalive” minority whose moral terms consist of notions of “good” and “bad.” The exercising of their powers and strengths, the lack of pain, and the complete celebration and enjoyment of life defines their “good.”
In contrast, “slave morality,” the “herd morality” of the weak masses (i.e. altruistic morality) originates in the “bad consciousness” and inverts master morality. Historically, this “priestly” morality is impotent when it comes to war, etc. This leads to its hatred/vengefulness. Nietzsche argues that in Judaism, we see the exemplar of this “reevaluation of their enemies’ values… an act of the most spiritual revenge” (Kaufmann 34). These priestly people embodied this deeply repressed vengefulness by inverting the “aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)” and proclaiming "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone - and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned!... One knows who inherited this Jewish reevaluation…" (Kaufmann 34).
Hence, the second category of human conception is those who take no pleasure in exercising dominance over others and find constraints on all aspects of life. They lack power and are therefore unable to exercise it in life. This group, which represents the overwhelming majority of humanity, defines the “good” according to a conception of weaknesses as virtues. Hence, mediocrity becomes a deliberately accepted lifestyle choice based on their unwillingness to overcome obstacles to achieve a sense of satisfaction. They convince themselves that their weaknesses are really strengths. Nietzsche views this as the “slave revolt” in morality. Nietzsche says we no longer see it because it has been victorious in creating ideals and reversing values. The morality of the common person (Judaized, Christianized, Mob-ized) has won! The Jews were the inventors of slave morality, Christians inherited and promoted it, and it has now become the prevailing view. This is important because it is an underlying reason Nietzsche chooses to write this text.
This is a crucial prelude to his discussion of “ressentiment” (I.10): "The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: The ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself;’ and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye - this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself - is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist. Slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all - its action is fundamentally reaction" (Kaufmann 36-37).
Nietzsche argues, “the reverse is the case with the noble mode of valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks the opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly - its negative concept ‘low,’ common,’ ‘bad’ is only a subsequently invented pale, contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept - filled with life and passion through and through” (Kaufmann 37). He says, “the ‘well-born’ felt themselves to be the ‘happy;’ they did not have to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they were happy (as all men of ressentiment are in the habit of doing)” (Kaufmann 38). The happy were necessarily active and it was part of their happiness. They were replete with energy. It was the impotent, the oppressed, that were passive.
According to Nietzsche, “a race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance” (Kaufmann 38-39). In contrast, ressentiment, if it appears among the noble, “consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison” (Kaufmann 39): “To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long - that is the sign of the strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget” (Kaufmann 39). The man of ressentiment stands in contrast, creating the “evil enemy,” and “this is in fact his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought, and pendant, a ‘good one’ - himself!” (Kaufmann 39). The noble man “conceives the basic concept ‘good’ in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates for himself an idea of ‘bad!’” (Kaufmann 39-40). Evil is the “distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality - how different these words ‘bad’ and ‘evil’ are, although they are both the opposite of the same concept ‘good’” (Kaufmann 40). In slave morality, overcome with ressentiment, “the good man” (within the noble paradigm) is seen as the evil enemy. Nietzsche sees the rise of slave morality as a “regression of mankind” (Kaufmann 43). It is an elevation of mediocrity. It ceases to affirm life. He wants to move beyond “good and evil” (Kaufmann 44).
In many ways, Nietzsche summarizes the catalyst of his whole book when he states, “here precisely has become a fatality for Europe - together with the fear of man we have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The sight of man now makes us weary - what is nihilism today if it is not that? - We are weary of man (Kaufmann 44, I.12). It is important to understand the descriptions of “aristocratic/knightly/noble” morality and “slave morality” above as an historical-psychological analysis for Nietzsche. This is significant because it was my contention that Nietzsche believes EVERYONE in modern society now falls under the illness of slave morality. In contrast, some of our fellow classmates gave possible modern examples in class that appeared to fit the description of Nietzsche’s “noble morality.” This led to some discussion and debate. I argued that Nietzsche’s analysis initially was intended to be descriptive historically and psychologically in a genealogical sense and that he does not intend the “overman” simply to recover the ancient noble morality of past, but to create one’s own values, as active “culture builders,” affirming and promoting life. Despite heralding the Roman culture and others, or individuals like Napoleon or Mirabeau, he clearly states that slave morality has won and has infected the masses (herd) and potential superalives alike. Hence, everyone is infected with “ressentiment” in the modern world. If my interpretation is correct, noble morality is a historical relic. No one fully represents the master/aristocratic morality in the modern era because the slave morality has won. Although he historically points to “noble morality” both to explain how we arrived at our present state and as exemplars of strength from the past, those who have the capacity now (“the superalives”) are still under the influence of slave morality. They must use their strength/will to power to become “culture builders” in new unique ways to create one’s own values. Although Nietzsche historically may like master morality better than slave morality, does not imply that he endorses master morality. Nietzsche seeks to free potential overmen from this illness and their bad conscience, not simply by reinstituting/recovering a brutish, animalist dominance sometimes envisioned by those who interpret the will to power in such a crude way. To borrow from the political theorist Hannah Arendt, he is not simply “pearl diving” into the ancient past romanticizing and wishing to recover it in a glorious recapitulation of a better days. Rather, he wants each overman to create one’s own unique values that are life affirming, unique, and culture building. While this may not preclude violence, self-overcoming and liberation from the morality of the masses is a higher order than some type of crude violent dominance. Once again, Nietzsche constantly affirms that the overman would show little interest in dominating weaker individuals. Any such actions are signs of illness and a waning will to power.
In contrast, some classmates interpreted Nietzsche as wanting a “recovery” of the historical version of “noble morality” and thought examples of this noble morality were embodied today in contemporary society. Noting several examples, others feared that this noble morality inevitably leads to violence, oppression, and tyranny. Despite my attempts to reject such examples under the premises I noted above, I acknowledged there is nothing in Nietzsche’s theory that would require any universal exclusions of violence. Hence, their reasons for concern are quite sound: If the “overman’s” sense of unbridled vitality and “will to power” defines the good, there does not seem to be anything constraining them from dominating others, particularly through violence. My idealist depiction of Nietzsche’s overman as an active, life promoting “culture builder,” uninterested in dominating those of weaker status, is of no comfort when you read passages from Nietzsche metaphorically romanticizing past noble virtues of “birds of prey” declaring, “‘we don’t dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb” (Kaufmann 45, 1.13). One could clearly have reasons to be concerned under such an interpretation.
Regardless of your position above, I did want to make clear that the opposition between master and slave morality is not primarily between people; but actually, can occur in a single person. Nietzsche continually tries to explain this “therapeutic” reality. It would be a mistake to think of it as primarily as a clash between people; it is not this kind of story (Kaufmann 52, I.16). Once again, according to Nietzsche, slave morality was pushed onto the psyche of not only the slaves/herd by the priests, but also onto the psyche of their masters! Hence, the battle has become internalized within the self. The individual person (i.e. overman) needs to use the “will to power” to overcome this internal illness and battle with the bad consciousness, etc.
Finally, in a related sense, it should not be overlooked that Nietzsche is an elitist. His audience is the “free-spirits” (i.e. the overmen). He is only writing a morality for the “superalives/culture-builders.” He has little concern for the morality of the masses. He is only concerned with liberating future “overmen” from the illness and effects of slave morality. He leaves conventional morality to “the herd,” provided they do not continue to infect the overmen with their “ressentiment.” The masses can be left to their morality, provided they get out of the way of the “culture builders.”
5. I know very little about Emmanuel Levinas. When I searched for his name online, many of his writings appeared to be in French. In addition to the readings we are doing in class, can you recommend any English translations of his texts?
Yes! Many of his works have been translated as his popularity has continued to grow. In terms of complete, individually published philosophical texts, I will limit my recommendations to only three books at the moment. My first recommendation would be a publication of a very short interview Levinas did called Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. In this short discussion, Levinas provides a nice overview of many of his central ideas. Most would agree, however, that his two most significant treatises explicitly related to his philosophical thought are Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (to be read sequentially).
If you are more interested in his religious thought, two excellent sources are my undergraduate professor Annette Aronowicz’s book Nine Talmudic Readings and Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism translated by Seán Hand.
Finally, if you prefer “reader style” books that offer shorter selections of Levinas’ writings, the following texts may be nice alternatives.
6. I have heard that Emmanuel Levinas has a dense, complicated writing style and may be extremely difficult to understand. Do you recommend any “secondary sources” that may help to explain his philosophical thought to supplement our class discussions?
Yes, but I have to admit I may be very biased in terms of my recommendations. In addition to feeling very fortunate to have studied under Professor Annette Aronowicz as an undergraduate, a translator of Levinas’ Talmudic writings (noted above), I also studied under a student of Emmanuel Levinas when I was in graduate school, Professor Adriaan Peperzak. Hence, my recommendations reflect this bias in my book selections below. Nevertheless, I think his books are outstanding resources for helping one understand Levinas’ philosophical teachings. I recommend you read them in the order listed below.
7. “Responsibility as the Precursor of Freedom:” A Preliminary Reflection on Emmanuel Levinas’ Understanding of Freedom
Last week in class, we spent the majority of our discussion answering the questions: “How does Levinas initially describe the “ethical relation?” How does he connect it with human freedom/sovereignty and obligation to the other?” I recently received a question from one of your classmates/colleagues, asking that I elaborate a little further specifically on the issue of Levinas’ understanding of freedom. I thought it may be helpful to incorporate some related comments from texts “outside” of last week's readings, that may broaden the discussion and help explain from a more “philosophical approach,” some of the “religious” insights Levinas was making in “Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism.” Again, what I have written below are just my preliminary reflections of Levinas’ understanding of freedom. As we continue to read his texts and expand more into excerpts of his philosophical works, we may find our views of these connections to the “face” and “responsibility” further developing as well.
In certain respects, Levinas commentary on freedom can be understood as a response to the modern conception of autonomy (as the beginning of an act, freedom of choice etc.). Levinas is very critical of “philosophies of freedom” and models that envision the “self” as all encompassing. These paradigms assume the “I” is transcendent and has the capacity to imagine and create oneself. He believes that these are assumptions of philosophers and idealists (in a pejorative sense) and irresponsible people. Levinas explains, “we have been accustomed to reason in the name of freedom of the ego - as though I had witnessed the creation of the world, and as though I could only have been in charge of a world that would have issued out of my free will” (Levinas, “Otherwise Than Being,” 122). Although Levinas clearly is not writing a philosophy of freedom, he does address it in terms of our relationships with others. Levinas does not see “freedom” as a source that one can “start from” or “go back to” for understanding the human condition. He rejects freedom as a mode of a “free-standing ego” that claims to possess the liberty to see things from transcendental insight and define humans as creators of reality. We do not invent our world. In contrast, our world is presented to us. For Levinas, “the Other’s emergence puts the freedom of the ego into question” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 68). Following this premise, responsibility emerges as a precursor to freedom.
Levinas argues that responsibility is not a choice (although we are “free” to appropriate it for ourselves), but a moment of recognition of the authentic self. One “obeys” before one discovers what is to be obeyed. We obey one another as speakers and respondents. He believes that the Torah is so present to us that we start by treating others with respect. Therefore, responsibility precedes all forms of consent or agreement. It dominates all our contracts with other people and orients us without our ever choosing or wanting this obligation to the other. Hence, responsibility is a dedication that is not chosen. This experience can be compared to our body urging us to eat. Such an initiative comes not from a “self” choice, but a requirement for existence. We find ourselves already engaged. Our initiatives are refinements of what already exists within the framework of our encounter with the other. Levinas believes that most initiatives are very small. Yet, real initiatives take place during dramatic circumstances.
Levinas does discuss freedom in “positive terms” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 107-185). In order to have an “I” to serve others, the “I” must be free in order to be responsible. Freedom is not abstract, but rooted in the world. “I” am independent because “I” am a being that lives “on” the world, enjoys the world (eats, bathes, dwells/inhabit, etc.). This is an egoism that is natural. For example, one cannot give food or enjoyment if one does not know or value what one gives. If one does not know happiness by experiencing life, one cannot give. This allows me to have a relationship with someone who is independent. It is also a precondition for us to be helpful to another. In this way, Levinas argues that movements such as “privatization” can never be the answer to freedom because they place autonomy above encounter of relationality in the face of the other. Our body and enjoyment must be understood in terms responsibility. In this way, responsibility requires freedom. Levinas claims that “...by showing that a corporeal and vitalistic enjoyment of elements and earthly goods makes it possible to establish oneself as an independent center of the world. The appearance of another - the fact of my being caught in heteronomy - puts restrictions on the extent of my hedonism, but it should not diminish my freedom” (Peperzak, “Beyond,” 37).
Hence, freedom is not defined as “the power to choose freely among different possibilities” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 68). It is not choice among infinite alternatives, but discretion within a selective group of alternatives (which are small and predictable). Responsibility “does not violate free will but rather gives it direction in giving it a task and a meaning” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 71). Levinas believes that this protects the free will by maintaining the separation between the other and me. In the encounter with the other, freedom as infinite choice discovers itself to be unjust. Levinas claims, “in turning to the alterity of the Other, I discover that my freedom is called into question; the Other’s appearance reveals the injustice of my monopoly” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 53). The other calls the self into question because the idea of the infinite is more fundamental than and precedes freedom. In the face-to-face situation, freedom finds that the Other stands as “master and judge.” He acknowledges:
Without autonomy and a certain egoism, the separation between the Same and the Other would be impossible: the two poles of the relationship would inevitably fuse. However, the autonomy of the I must be submitted to the primordial relation and discover its true significance by respecting the highness of the Other, which gives it its task (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 70).
He also emphasizes this point in terms of the “strangeness of the Other.” Levinas argues that “free beings alone can be strangers to one another. Their freedom which is ‘common’ to them is precisely what separates them” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 74).
Human freedom cannot justify itself. Freedom, in terms of autonomy, can only be invested by the Other. Levinas asserts that “no movement of freedom could appropriate a face to itself or seem to ‘constitute’ it” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 118). Morality alone puts freedom into question: “The justification of freedom - which otherwise would be arbitrary, violent, and shameless - comes from ‘morality’ or ‘the ethical’” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 207). The discovery of this obligation defines freedom. Levinas explains that “freedom does not resemble the capricious spontaneity of free will; its ultimate meaning lies in this permanence in the same, which is reason. Cognition is the deployment of this identity; it is freedom” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 43).
Yet, for Levinas, being a servant of another is not the same as being a slave. He claims that “existence is not in reality condemned to freedom, but is invested as freedom. Freedom is not bare. To philosophize is to trace freedom back to what lies before it, to disclose the investiture that liberates freedom from the arbitrary” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 85). Freedom, therefore, is not the beginning. Most things have been done before we are born and we bend or adapt to these realities. Not everything can be changed. Freedom always starts with what already exists. There is always something before it. For Levinas, one discovers oneself “responsible” before one can take any initiative. This discover comes through the act of speaking and encounter. Responsibility cannot be “proved,” but must be experienced. Levinas believes that responsibility is a reality that exists before one is human. Responsibility does not just emerge at a particular moment (i.e. not just a moment in which we should be responsible). For Levinas, responsibility is not something that happens one day; but discovered all the time by everyone. It is given to you as a human destiny. Responsibility comes from the past (not in the sense of history), but before human beings came to be. Freedom, therefore, cannot be the origin of meaning. Responsibility, which must be obeyed, precedes all choices or “free initiatives.”
For Levinas, the process of choosing itself is normed by passivity (for the other). All choices are foreshadowed by this orientation. This being a “hostage to the other” is not slavery, but a good that enables freedom for the other and the self. This responsibility gives humanity its ultimate meaning and significance. It is a push to want what is good. Ethics, therefore, must not be understood in terms of choice, but evaluated according to our response in encounter. Failure to do the good (i.e. be responsible) is not a free choice but a sign of weakness. Freedom emerges in our choice to be morally sound or morally weak. All possibilities of being human are in play. Responsibility must include our will, not only in terms of direction, but assenting to and purifying our obligation to the other. Our loving response to the other comes from an encounter with the face. I am totally demanded in this obligation that is limitless. I am also responsible for the other and the other’s actions. It is a burden we would not choose on our own because it may lead to suffering. Nevertheless, you cannot delegate this responsibility. It is an obsession that can never be quenched. Yet, it is a responsibility that makes you irreplaceable. We are elected and chosen to be responsible. Ultimately, freedom is our ability to accept who we are in acknowledging our responsibility for the other.
8. “Infinity and the Face?” “Ethics and the Face?” “Reason and the Face?” In our readings, Emmanuel Levinas is constantly talking about “the face” when "encountering the other." What is Levinas’ understanding of the meaning and relevance of “the face?”
In both “Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority” and “Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence,” Emmanuel Levinas spends a considerable amount of time discussing the importance of the face. Levinas uses terms such as otherness, infinity and absoluteness to describe the face. Revelation and epiphany are also used in explaining our encountered relationship with the infinite. The face is the starting point of philosophy because it ushers forth the relation between the “other” and me. Since the “other” escapes one’s idea of “being,” one can never completely comprehend the face. Levinas explains, “the face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched - for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content” (“Totality and Infinity,” 194). In its refusal to be contained, fit into, or be a part of the totality, the face is an indivisible “interruption” (or rupture) to the whole. More explicitly, Levinas means that one’s encounter with a unique, separate, and infinite other limits our “self-indulgent” activities. The experience of facing reveals this separation. Levinas states, “the idea of infinity, revealed in the face, does not only require a separated being; the light of the face is necessary for separation” (“Totality and Infinity,” 151). In “To The Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” Adriaan Peperzak says it is a “conceptless experience” (118) that cannot be destroyed (since “facing” itself does not belong to things that can be created or destroyed). This infinitude that faces me denies the finite which composes the totality because the face remains completely separate and cannot be added to the whole.
According to Levinas, “the face resists possession, resists my powers. In its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total resistance to the grasp” (“Totality and Infinity,” 197). “Power” should not be understood in terms of one force opposing another force in a Hobbesian or Machiavellian framework. For Levinas, one cannot kill the other when encountering the face because one cannot reach the other through violence. Since the other cannot be transformed by me or possessed by me, killing cannot make disappear “that which cannot be subsumed.” In the face and the realization of its “radical otherness,” one does not long or desire to destroy the one encountered. Rather, one becomes aware that no dominance or mastery is possible. Levinas explains, “to kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power” (“Totality and Infinity,” 198). Levinas continues, “I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill” (“Totality and Infinity,” 198).
Peperzak further develops this point by explaining that “the other’s face (or speech) is not similar to a work or to language as structure or text or literary tradition; its infinite resistance to my powers is not a power - as if we were still in the dimension of Hobbes’s war of equal wills - but an expression that forbids and commands me ethically” (“To The Other,” 164). Levinas describes this encounter as a “non-allergic, ethical relation” of “transitivity” where the very non-violent epiphany of the face is produced (“Totality and Infinity,” 51). Hence, the face should not be understood as an opposing force to one’s own force “on the move” in the world. In contrast, it calls a living being to question “spontaneous acts of power” and violence against the other. Peperzak states, “‘face’ is the word Levinas chooses to indicate the alterity of the Other forbidding me to exercise my narcissistic violence. ‘Language’ is another expression of the same nucleus of meaning if it is understood as spoken language or discourse and not as a text detached from its author. The Other regards me and speaks to me; you are my interlocker; ‘the face speaks.’ This is the concrete way in which I am in relation with the infinite” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 64). Hence, Levinas believes that this encounter of the face is primarily concerned with not doing violence toward the other. According to Peperzak, “the face-to-face is a sincere and sober response more concerned with not doing violence than with aesthetic enjoyments. The instruction brought to me by the emergence of a face is neither a dogma nor a miracle but the initiation of a meaning” (“To The Other,” 165).
In “Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” Peperzak describes how the other’s face, in his or her looking at me, demands that I be responsible for his or her “existence, life, and behavior” (11). The other’s face is not an enemy or an impediment to be analyzed and overcome. Rather, the face is what “measures me” and demands justice (“To The Other,” 116). Levinas explains, “The idea of infinity exceeds my powers (not quantitatively, but… by calling them into question) it does not come from our a priori depths - it is consequently experience par excellence” (“Totality and Infinity,” 196). Hence, this emerges in the experience of encounter with the face. Yet, in this central claim of a call to obligation in encounter, “the other absolutely other - the Other - does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it. The relation with the other as face heals allergy. It is desire, teaching received, and the pacific opposition to discourse” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 197). Levinas explains that in welcoming the face, “the ‘resistance’ of the other does not do violence to me, does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical” (“Totality and Infinity,” 197).
The face solidifies this responsibility to the other through its proximity. Although it can never be “fully seen” (and precedes both words and deeds), the face remains present. In describing the face as a “presence” that refuses to be contained, Levinas argues that “facing” the other “presents the self” to me. In many respects, the presentation of a face can be understood as synonymous with “addressing”. In a more colloquial sense, a “given” waiting for a “giver”. Peperzak does note the ambiguity that can be associated with the concept of “addressing” since it can mean to listen, speak, provoke dedication, devotion, among other modes of interaction. Nevertheless, Peperzak asserts, “...[the] human face-to-face, is the ‘experience’ in which that relationship becomes concrete. The infinity of the other’s face, that is, its exteriority and absoluteness, its impossibility of being ranged among the phenomena of my world and of being seen as a figure against a wider background, is the only possible revelation of the infinite as described before. The word ‘face’ can be replaced by ‘expression’ or ‘word’ or ‘speech’ (la parole). Face, speech, and expression are the concrete manners by which the irreducibility of the Other comes to the fore and surprises me, disrupts my world, accuses, and refuses my egoism” (“To The Other,” 142). Ultimately, for Levinas, “the epiphany of infinity is expression and discourse” (“Totality and Infinity,” 200) and “the epiphany of the face is ethical” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 199).
In this disruption that demands a level of physical “proximity,” the other remains “infinitely transcendent”. Levinas states, “the Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our existence. Speech proceeds from absolute difference” (“Totality and Infinity,” 194). Levinas claims that “better than comprehension, discourse relates with what remains essentially transcendent” (“Totality and Infinity,” 195). This means that the formal work of language “consists in presenting the transcendent” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 195). By transcendent, Levinas is referring to that which is: (1) Not an element of what can be seen, touched, grasped, or any elements of the world, yet (2) touches or reaches the other which does not belong to my world. Therefore, once again, the “other” must be understood as that which pierces, breaks, and interrupts my world. For Levinas, if we look at someone, we come to see the person as a “unique fact” that cannot be changed, replaced, or ignored. Although not advocating a “human rights theory,” every person has “rights”. Furthermore, Levinas reverses the traditional notion of altruism by claiming that respect for the self comes out of respect for others. For Levinas, in the face we are made aware that all humans deserve the same level of respect regardless of their social status in the world. One must be responsible for you and the “other beyond you” (responsible for other’s other). One cannot “place” you when you speak or make you fit among the things that compose the totality. This is because “speaking” is not finite, an entity, an element, or just a part of the totality.
The face “breaks through” the form because it is unique and separate from any constructed system. The form delimits all the aspects that make up the specificity of a being [an idea, ousia, essence, way of being of a thing, shape taken, etc.]. For Levinas, one is never identical with any descriptive aspect of a person since one cannot be completely identified with what one does, thinks, feels, or desires. Hence, the face is said to “break through” form. The other becomes “concrete” in the face and through speech. An extraordinary relation emerges when another looks at me and speaks to me. Peperzak explains that “Levinas shows how the extraordinary relation opened by another’s looking at me and speaking to me causes discontinuity of the encompassing world and context that is common to us... Ego’s autonomy is shocked and put into question” (“To The Other,” 164). Levinas states, “…the idea of infinity, far from violating the mind, conditions nonviolence itself, that is, establishes ethics. The other is not for reason a scandal… but the first teaching. A being receiving the idea of Infinity, receiving since it cannot derive it from itself, is being taught in a non-maieutic fashion, a being whose very existing consists in this incessant reception of teaching in this incessant overflowing of self (which is time). To think is to have the idea of infinity, or to be taught. Rational thought refers to this teaching” (“Totality and Infinity,” 204). Levinas believes that this confrontation with the face presupposes that the other is an “end” in itself. He writes, “the face is a living presence; it is expression. The life of expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby dissimulated. The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse... He at each moment undoes the form he presents” (“Totality and Infinity,” 66). In the appearance of the other, one’s “monopoly of the world” is rejected as infinite obligations of the self “to the other” emerges. “The other is… the first rational teaching, the condition for all teaching” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 203). The face forces one to question one’s egocentric, autonomous paradigm and demands that one submit to the needs of another.
This is why Levinas starts his analysis of one’s relationship to the face under the mode of separation. Levinas’ view can be understood as a claim that stands opposed to Hegel’s privilege of the “unity in relationship” in his discussion about it as all part of the same genus (homogenous source of difference). The “approaching” of the other is different from all other relationships because proximity cannot be possessed or mastered. For Levinas, the face forces one to reject the premise that all individuals are part of a project of the general whole. He argues that the self remains distinct in its obligation to be responsible for the other. Levinas is rejecting modern conceptions of the self which attempt to appropriate or integrate all things into the ego as a “master/possessor/owner” of “nature/universe”. He refuses to embrace the idea of the self as all-encompassing and conscious of the entirety. Levinas wants to show a more “primordial principle” about what it means to be human. This epiphany reveals that the “I” exists for the other and one’s entire being or “task” must be oriented toward the other. One’s entrance to the other’s world brings with it an inherent “responsibility”. This acknowledgment of my responsibility to the other is an appeal without properties. For example, this appeal is not a response to the beauty (or some specific quality) of the Other. According to Levinas, “the thematization of a face undoes the face and undoes the approach. The mode in which a face indicates its own absence in my responsibility requires a description that can be formed only in ethical language” (“Otherwise Than Being,” 94). In this encounter, people speak, look at me, and have a face. Levinas believes that this encounter is self-evident. If you do not see it, in a colloquial sense, you are a potential murderer. The first unspoken, self-evident word was “thou shall not kill.” For Levinas, there is no way to “prove” this premise. One’s eyes make it clear to me that if I kill you, I am the one who loses.
This insertion of the other demands a response: “To encounter another is to discover that I am under a basic obligation: the human Other’s infinity reveals itself as a command: the fact of the Other’s ‘epiphany’ reveals that I am his or her servant” (Peperzak, “Beyond,” 5). This experience with the other revealed in both the “revelation of the face” and the “absoluteness of speaking” demands that one listen. “Thematization” makes it disappear. Levinas starts with the recognition of the brute fact that we are talking to each other. Therefore, the question is not: How can I (as conscious) talk to the other? Rather, the question is: What structure of our talking to each other are we communicating? This is the only appropriate attitude toward the other in this encounter because the face demands “generosity, donation” (Peperzak, “To The Other,” 142). Levinas explains, “This is positively produced as the possession of a world I can bestow as a gift on the Other - that is, as a presence before a face. For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands... The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name the face” (“Totality and Infinity,” 50).
Paradoxically, the face can be understood as both a concrete and infinite demand for a response of generosity. In a world that is common to us, the face of the other manifesting itself presents a moment of “epiphany.” For Levinas, the face emerges as a mission in which one does not experience “self” as “self”, but as self-given to self. It is a task given to me as the one who has to serve the other. In a general sense, Levinas is arguing that you cannot walk away from what you are (always for others). It is also important to note, therefore, that one must work to ensure that one’s own self-existence (physical health) does not degenerate in a way that makes one is incapable of “being for the other”. This task is a duty that one has to fulfill.
Ultimately, in the face we see the other for whom we are responsible. Levinas states, “the face of a neighbor signifies for me an unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract. It escapes representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality” (“Otherwise Than Being,” 88). Therefore, the face is both a “fact” revealing the other and a “command” toward the other. It is the infinite which opens the world to the other in its indivisibility and its refusal to be contained or destroyed. Through this interruption of the totality, we are called to be responsible to the other. Simply put, in this way “the good” is present in so far as people help others. This simultaneously reveals that our reason inherently points to something that is beyond itself. For Levinas, when we encounter a person on the street, one already knows what one has to do. This innate calling of responsibility is the ultimate foundation of human life which is discovered at the moment one looks at a fellow human person in proximity. The face calls us to a responsible relationship with the other. In sum, “the face ‘is’ and ‘shows’ its imperative, obligating character. The answer to the question “What is the face? (or ‘What does it disclose?’) is: ‘The face obligates me; it reveals that I am already devoted to the one who looks at me; I am responsible for you” (Peperzak, “Beyond,” 222).
All OLLI members (which includes those enrolled for Fall courses) should have received an email newsletter from OLLI with instructions for finding their course links in the “Student Portal.” It explained that “if any of your students ask, please direct them to https://olliatduke.online for those instructions and other related information.”
Essentially, OLLI members who register for Fall term courses will find the Zoom links in their “Learnmore Student Portal,” which is the same website used for course registration. The link for each course will remain the same for every session of your course. https://learnmore.duke.edu/front
Again, directions on how to use the link above can be found here: https://www.olliatduke.online/studentlink.html
2. In addition to PDF copies of the Levinas readings, I noticed on this website you provide a link to a free online version of Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Yet, you also state that you “strongly suggest” that we purchase the edition translated by Walter Kaufmann. Why? If we choose to use a different translation or an online version, will we have trouble following along and participating in class discussions?
I have always felt that translations are as much an “artform” as a “science.” Hence, I recommended purchasing the Kaufmann edition of the Nietzsche text, versus simply reading the older, free online translation, because I find it more accessible, easier to understand, and less prone to misinterpretation. Nevertheless, feel free to look at the free online version first, or any alternative translation that you prefer, before you make any purchase. Obviously, if you find another version easy to read, comprehend, etc., then you are more than welcome to use it.
Please Note: Although I will be using the page numbers from the Kaufmann edition, I also have listed the section numbers of the text so you can follow along regardless of the translation you choose.
For example, the first reading assignment is On the Genealogy of Morals, 15-23; 24-27, 33-46 [Preface: 1-8; 1st Essay: 1-3, 7-13].
The page numbers refer only to the Kaufman edition. This means that those who own the Kaufmann edition will be reading pages 15-23; 24-27; 33-46. I also intentionally provided the section references so you can use any version of the text. Regardless of your version, in this example everyone will be reading the following sections of the text in ALL EDITIONS: Preface: 1-8; 1st Essay: 1-3, 7-13. Hence, the sections are identical in all versions, but the page numbers only apply to the Kaufmann edition.
Finally, the “questions to consider as you read in preparation for class discussion” are intended to help you focus your analysis of the texts in preparation for our next class. Alternatively, if you prefer, you may bring to class any particular passages you encounter that you find compelling or thought provoking for us to discuss. This is your class, so I am always open to hearing your thoughts and insights about the readings!
3. I have been told that Friedrich Nietzsche was a very prolific writer. What books did he publish?
In 1872, Nietzsche published his first book, The Birth of Tragedy. Between 1873 and 1876, he published four separate long essays which later appeared in a collected edition under the title Untimely Meditations. In 1878, he published Human, All Too Human. Although his health began to decline, he continued to work as an independent philosopher and published one book or section of a book each year until 1888 (completing five that year alone). His published works are listed chronologically below:
WORKS
- The Birth of Tragedy (1872)
- On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (1873)
- Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873)
- Untimely Meditations (1876)
- Human, All Too Human (1878)
- The Dawn (1881)
- The Gay Science (1882)
- Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883)
- Beyond Good and Evil (1886)
- On the Genealogy of Morality (1887)
- The Case of Wagner (1888)
- Twilight of the Idols (1888)
- The Antichrist (1888)
- Ecce Homo (1888; first published in 1908)
- Nietzsche contra Wagner (1888)
- The Will to Power (various unpublished manuscripts edited by his sister Elisabeth; not recognized as a unified work until after ca 1960)
- Kaufmann, Walter (Ed. and Trans.). Basic Writings of Nietzsche. New York: The Modern Library, 1992.
- ____. The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Viking Penguin Inc, 1982.
4) In class there was an extended discussion/debate regarding Nietzsche’s understanding of “ressentiment,” his conception of slave vs. noble morality, and whether examples of “noble morality” existed in the modern world. Can you briefly clarify your understanding of Nietzsche’s position?
The backdrop to our class discussion was Nietzsche’s distinction between master and slave morality. We began by establishing the “aristocratic/knightly/noble” morality of the powerful minority [the “superalives”] (I.7-9). Their “value judgements presuppose a powerful physicality, a flourishing…” abundant health and that which preserves it, and “all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity” (Kaufmann 33). They find complete contentment and satisfaction through the mere exercising of one’s power and strength. Nietzsche believes that this type of person stands as an exemplar to the rest of humanity. He categorizes these people as the “superalive” minority whose moral terms consist of notions of “good” and “bad.” The exercising of their powers and strengths, the lack of pain, and the complete celebration and enjoyment of life defines their “good.”
In contrast, “slave morality,” the “herd morality” of the weak masses (i.e. altruistic morality) originates in the “bad consciousness” and inverts master morality. Historically, this “priestly” morality is impotent when it comes to war, etc. This leads to its hatred/vengefulness. Nietzsche argues that in Judaism, we see the exemplar of this “reevaluation of their enemies’ values… an act of the most spiritual revenge” (Kaufmann 34). These priestly people embodied this deeply repressed vengefulness by inverting the “aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)” and proclaiming "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone - and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned!... One knows who inherited this Jewish reevaluation…" (Kaufmann 34).
Hence, the second category of human conception is those who take no pleasure in exercising dominance over others and find constraints on all aspects of life. They lack power and are therefore unable to exercise it in life. This group, which represents the overwhelming majority of humanity, defines the “good” according to a conception of weaknesses as virtues. Hence, mediocrity becomes a deliberately accepted lifestyle choice based on their unwillingness to overcome obstacles to achieve a sense of satisfaction. They convince themselves that their weaknesses are really strengths. Nietzsche views this as the “slave revolt” in morality. Nietzsche says we no longer see it because it has been victorious in creating ideals and reversing values. The morality of the common person (Judaized, Christianized, Mob-ized) has won! The Jews were the inventors of slave morality, Christians inherited and promoted it, and it has now become the prevailing view. This is important because it is an underlying reason Nietzsche chooses to write this text.
This is a crucial prelude to his discussion of “ressentiment” (I.10): "The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: The ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself;’ and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye - this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself - is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist. Slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all - its action is fundamentally reaction" (Kaufmann 36-37).
Nietzsche argues, “the reverse is the case with the noble mode of valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks the opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly - its negative concept ‘low,’ common,’ ‘bad’ is only a subsequently invented pale, contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept - filled with life and passion through and through” (Kaufmann 37). He says, “the ‘well-born’ felt themselves to be the ‘happy;’ they did not have to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they were happy (as all men of ressentiment are in the habit of doing)” (Kaufmann 38). The happy were necessarily active and it was part of their happiness. They were replete with energy. It was the impotent, the oppressed, that were passive.
According to Nietzsche, “a race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance” (Kaufmann 38-39). In contrast, ressentiment, if it appears among the noble, “consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison” (Kaufmann 39): “To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long - that is the sign of the strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget” (Kaufmann 39). The man of ressentiment stands in contrast, creating the “evil enemy,” and “this is in fact his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought, and pendant, a ‘good one’ - himself!” (Kaufmann 39). The noble man “conceives the basic concept ‘good’ in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates for himself an idea of ‘bad!’” (Kaufmann 39-40). Evil is the “distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality - how different these words ‘bad’ and ‘evil’ are, although they are both the opposite of the same concept ‘good’” (Kaufmann 40). In slave morality, overcome with ressentiment, “the good man” (within the noble paradigm) is seen as the evil enemy. Nietzsche sees the rise of slave morality as a “regression of mankind” (Kaufmann 43). It is an elevation of mediocrity. It ceases to affirm life. He wants to move beyond “good and evil” (Kaufmann 44).
In many ways, Nietzsche summarizes the catalyst of his whole book when he states, “here precisely has become a fatality for Europe - together with the fear of man we have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The sight of man now makes us weary - what is nihilism today if it is not that? - We are weary of man (Kaufmann 44, I.12). It is important to understand the descriptions of “aristocratic/knightly/noble” morality and “slave morality” above as an historical-psychological analysis for Nietzsche. This is significant because it was my contention that Nietzsche believes EVERYONE in modern society now falls under the illness of slave morality. In contrast, some of our fellow classmates gave possible modern examples in class that appeared to fit the description of Nietzsche’s “noble morality.” This led to some discussion and debate. I argued that Nietzsche’s analysis initially was intended to be descriptive historically and psychologically in a genealogical sense and that he does not intend the “overman” simply to recover the ancient noble morality of past, but to create one’s own values, as active “culture builders,” affirming and promoting life. Despite heralding the Roman culture and others, or individuals like Napoleon or Mirabeau, he clearly states that slave morality has won and has infected the masses (herd) and potential superalives alike. Hence, everyone is infected with “ressentiment” in the modern world. If my interpretation is correct, noble morality is a historical relic. No one fully represents the master/aristocratic morality in the modern era because the slave morality has won. Although he historically points to “noble morality” both to explain how we arrived at our present state and as exemplars of strength from the past, those who have the capacity now (“the superalives”) are still under the influence of slave morality. They must use their strength/will to power to become “culture builders” in new unique ways to create one’s own values. Although Nietzsche historically may like master morality better than slave morality, does not imply that he endorses master morality. Nietzsche seeks to free potential overmen from this illness and their bad conscience, not simply by reinstituting/recovering a brutish, animalist dominance sometimes envisioned by those who interpret the will to power in such a crude way. To borrow from the political theorist Hannah Arendt, he is not simply “pearl diving” into the ancient past romanticizing and wishing to recover it in a glorious recapitulation of a better days. Rather, he wants each overman to create one’s own unique values that are life affirming, unique, and culture building. While this may not preclude violence, self-overcoming and liberation from the morality of the masses is a higher order than some type of crude violent dominance. Once again, Nietzsche constantly affirms that the overman would show little interest in dominating weaker individuals. Any such actions are signs of illness and a waning will to power.
In contrast, some classmates interpreted Nietzsche as wanting a “recovery” of the historical version of “noble morality” and thought examples of this noble morality were embodied today in contemporary society. Noting several examples, others feared that this noble morality inevitably leads to violence, oppression, and tyranny. Despite my attempts to reject such examples under the premises I noted above, I acknowledged there is nothing in Nietzsche’s theory that would require any universal exclusions of violence. Hence, their reasons for concern are quite sound: If the “overman’s” sense of unbridled vitality and “will to power” defines the good, there does not seem to be anything constraining them from dominating others, particularly through violence. My idealist depiction of Nietzsche’s overman as an active, life promoting “culture builder,” uninterested in dominating those of weaker status, is of no comfort when you read passages from Nietzsche metaphorically romanticizing past noble virtues of “birds of prey” declaring, “‘we don’t dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb” (Kaufmann 45, 1.13). One could clearly have reasons to be concerned under such an interpretation.
Regardless of your position above, I did want to make clear that the opposition between master and slave morality is not primarily between people; but actually, can occur in a single person. Nietzsche continually tries to explain this “therapeutic” reality. It would be a mistake to think of it as primarily as a clash between people; it is not this kind of story (Kaufmann 52, I.16). Once again, according to Nietzsche, slave morality was pushed onto the psyche of not only the slaves/herd by the priests, but also onto the psyche of their masters! Hence, the battle has become internalized within the self. The individual person (i.e. overman) needs to use the “will to power” to overcome this internal illness and battle with the bad consciousness, etc.
Finally, in a related sense, it should not be overlooked that Nietzsche is an elitist. His audience is the “free-spirits” (i.e. the overmen). He is only writing a morality for the “superalives/culture-builders.” He has little concern for the morality of the masses. He is only concerned with liberating future “overmen” from the illness and effects of slave morality. He leaves conventional morality to “the herd,” provided they do not continue to infect the overmen with their “ressentiment.” The masses can be left to their morality, provided they get out of the way of the “culture builders.”
5. I know very little about Emmanuel Levinas. When I searched for his name online, many of his writings appeared to be in French. In addition to the readings we are doing in class, can you recommend any English translations of his texts?
Yes! Many of his works have been translated as his popularity has continued to grow. In terms of complete, individually published philosophical texts, I will limit my recommendations to only three books at the moment. My first recommendation would be a publication of a very short interview Levinas did called Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. In this short discussion, Levinas provides a nice overview of many of his central ideas. Most would agree, however, that his two most significant treatises explicitly related to his philosophical thought are Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (to be read sequentially).
- Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985.
- ____. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1978.
- ____. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
If you are more interested in his religious thought, two excellent sources are my undergraduate professor Annette Aronowicz’s book Nine Talmudic Readings and Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism translated by Seán Hand.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. Translated by Seán Hand. London: Athlone, 1991.
- ____. Nine Talmudic Readings. Translated by Annette Aronowicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Finally, if you prefer “reader style” books that offer shorter selections of Levinas’ writings, the following texts may be nice alternatives.
- Peperzak, Adriaan, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Eds.). Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- Seán Hand (Ed.). The Levinas Reader: Emmanuel Levinas. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989.
6. I have heard that Emmanuel Levinas has a dense, complicated writing style and may be extremely difficult to understand. Do you recommend any “secondary sources” that may help to explain his philosophical thought to supplement our class discussions?
Yes, but I have to admit I may be very biased in terms of my recommendations. In addition to feeling very fortunate to have studied under Professor Annette Aronowicz as an undergraduate, a translator of Levinas’ Talmudic writings (noted above), I also studied under a student of Emmanuel Levinas when I was in graduate school, Professor Adriaan Peperzak. Hence, my recommendations reflect this bias in my book selections below. Nevertheless, I think his books are outstanding resources for helping one understand Levinas’ philosophical teachings. I recommend you read them in the order listed below.
- Peperzak, Adriaan T. To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993.
- ____. Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997.
- ____. (Editor). Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, New York: Routledge, 1995.
7. “Responsibility as the Precursor of Freedom:” A Preliminary Reflection on Emmanuel Levinas’ Understanding of Freedom
Last week in class, we spent the majority of our discussion answering the questions: “How does Levinas initially describe the “ethical relation?” How does he connect it with human freedom/sovereignty and obligation to the other?” I recently received a question from one of your classmates/colleagues, asking that I elaborate a little further specifically on the issue of Levinas’ understanding of freedom. I thought it may be helpful to incorporate some related comments from texts “outside” of last week's readings, that may broaden the discussion and help explain from a more “philosophical approach,” some of the “religious” insights Levinas was making in “Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism.” Again, what I have written below are just my preliminary reflections of Levinas’ understanding of freedom. As we continue to read his texts and expand more into excerpts of his philosophical works, we may find our views of these connections to the “face” and “responsibility” further developing as well.
In certain respects, Levinas commentary on freedom can be understood as a response to the modern conception of autonomy (as the beginning of an act, freedom of choice etc.). Levinas is very critical of “philosophies of freedom” and models that envision the “self” as all encompassing. These paradigms assume the “I” is transcendent and has the capacity to imagine and create oneself. He believes that these are assumptions of philosophers and idealists (in a pejorative sense) and irresponsible people. Levinas explains, “we have been accustomed to reason in the name of freedom of the ego - as though I had witnessed the creation of the world, and as though I could only have been in charge of a world that would have issued out of my free will” (Levinas, “Otherwise Than Being,” 122). Although Levinas clearly is not writing a philosophy of freedom, he does address it in terms of our relationships with others. Levinas does not see “freedom” as a source that one can “start from” or “go back to” for understanding the human condition. He rejects freedom as a mode of a “free-standing ego” that claims to possess the liberty to see things from transcendental insight and define humans as creators of reality. We do not invent our world. In contrast, our world is presented to us. For Levinas, “the Other’s emergence puts the freedom of the ego into question” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 68). Following this premise, responsibility emerges as a precursor to freedom.
Levinas argues that responsibility is not a choice (although we are “free” to appropriate it for ourselves), but a moment of recognition of the authentic self. One “obeys” before one discovers what is to be obeyed. We obey one another as speakers and respondents. He believes that the Torah is so present to us that we start by treating others with respect. Therefore, responsibility precedes all forms of consent or agreement. It dominates all our contracts with other people and orients us without our ever choosing or wanting this obligation to the other. Hence, responsibility is a dedication that is not chosen. This experience can be compared to our body urging us to eat. Such an initiative comes not from a “self” choice, but a requirement for existence. We find ourselves already engaged. Our initiatives are refinements of what already exists within the framework of our encounter with the other. Levinas believes that most initiatives are very small. Yet, real initiatives take place during dramatic circumstances.
Levinas does discuss freedom in “positive terms” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 107-185). In order to have an “I” to serve others, the “I” must be free in order to be responsible. Freedom is not abstract, but rooted in the world. “I” am independent because “I” am a being that lives “on” the world, enjoys the world (eats, bathes, dwells/inhabit, etc.). This is an egoism that is natural. For example, one cannot give food or enjoyment if one does not know or value what one gives. If one does not know happiness by experiencing life, one cannot give. This allows me to have a relationship with someone who is independent. It is also a precondition for us to be helpful to another. In this way, Levinas argues that movements such as “privatization” can never be the answer to freedom because they place autonomy above encounter of relationality in the face of the other. Our body and enjoyment must be understood in terms responsibility. In this way, responsibility requires freedom. Levinas claims that “...by showing that a corporeal and vitalistic enjoyment of elements and earthly goods makes it possible to establish oneself as an independent center of the world. The appearance of another - the fact of my being caught in heteronomy - puts restrictions on the extent of my hedonism, but it should not diminish my freedom” (Peperzak, “Beyond,” 37).
Hence, freedom is not defined as “the power to choose freely among different possibilities” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 68). It is not choice among infinite alternatives, but discretion within a selective group of alternatives (which are small and predictable). Responsibility “does not violate free will but rather gives it direction in giving it a task and a meaning” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 71). Levinas believes that this protects the free will by maintaining the separation between the other and me. In the encounter with the other, freedom as infinite choice discovers itself to be unjust. Levinas claims, “in turning to the alterity of the Other, I discover that my freedom is called into question; the Other’s appearance reveals the injustice of my monopoly” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 53). The other calls the self into question because the idea of the infinite is more fundamental than and precedes freedom. In the face-to-face situation, freedom finds that the Other stands as “master and judge.” He acknowledges:
Without autonomy and a certain egoism, the separation between the Same and the Other would be impossible: the two poles of the relationship would inevitably fuse. However, the autonomy of the I must be submitted to the primordial relation and discover its true significance by respecting the highness of the Other, which gives it its task (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 70).
He also emphasizes this point in terms of the “strangeness of the Other.” Levinas argues that “free beings alone can be strangers to one another. Their freedom which is ‘common’ to them is precisely what separates them” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 74).
Human freedom cannot justify itself. Freedom, in terms of autonomy, can only be invested by the Other. Levinas asserts that “no movement of freedom could appropriate a face to itself or seem to ‘constitute’ it” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 118). Morality alone puts freedom into question: “The justification of freedom - which otherwise would be arbitrary, violent, and shameless - comes from ‘morality’ or ‘the ethical’” (Peperzak, “To the Other,” 207). The discovery of this obligation defines freedom. Levinas explains that “freedom does not resemble the capricious spontaneity of free will; its ultimate meaning lies in this permanence in the same, which is reason. Cognition is the deployment of this identity; it is freedom” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 43).
Yet, for Levinas, being a servant of another is not the same as being a slave. He claims that “existence is not in reality condemned to freedom, but is invested as freedom. Freedom is not bare. To philosophize is to trace freedom back to what lies before it, to disclose the investiture that liberates freedom from the arbitrary” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 85). Freedom, therefore, is not the beginning. Most things have been done before we are born and we bend or adapt to these realities. Not everything can be changed. Freedom always starts with what already exists. There is always something before it. For Levinas, one discovers oneself “responsible” before one can take any initiative. This discover comes through the act of speaking and encounter. Responsibility cannot be “proved,” but must be experienced. Levinas believes that responsibility is a reality that exists before one is human. Responsibility does not just emerge at a particular moment (i.e. not just a moment in which we should be responsible). For Levinas, responsibility is not something that happens one day; but discovered all the time by everyone. It is given to you as a human destiny. Responsibility comes from the past (not in the sense of history), but before human beings came to be. Freedom, therefore, cannot be the origin of meaning. Responsibility, which must be obeyed, precedes all choices or “free initiatives.”
For Levinas, the process of choosing itself is normed by passivity (for the other). All choices are foreshadowed by this orientation. This being a “hostage to the other” is not slavery, but a good that enables freedom for the other and the self. This responsibility gives humanity its ultimate meaning and significance. It is a push to want what is good. Ethics, therefore, must not be understood in terms of choice, but evaluated according to our response in encounter. Failure to do the good (i.e. be responsible) is not a free choice but a sign of weakness. Freedom emerges in our choice to be morally sound or morally weak. All possibilities of being human are in play. Responsibility must include our will, not only in terms of direction, but assenting to and purifying our obligation to the other. Our loving response to the other comes from an encounter with the face. I am totally demanded in this obligation that is limitless. I am also responsible for the other and the other’s actions. It is a burden we would not choose on our own because it may lead to suffering. Nevertheless, you cannot delegate this responsibility. It is an obsession that can never be quenched. Yet, it is a responsibility that makes you irreplaceable. We are elected and chosen to be responsible. Ultimately, freedom is our ability to accept who we are in acknowledging our responsibility for the other.
8. “Infinity and the Face?” “Ethics and the Face?” “Reason and the Face?” In our readings, Emmanuel Levinas is constantly talking about “the face” when "encountering the other." What is Levinas’ understanding of the meaning and relevance of “the face?”
In both “Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority” and “Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence,” Emmanuel Levinas spends a considerable amount of time discussing the importance of the face. Levinas uses terms such as otherness, infinity and absoluteness to describe the face. Revelation and epiphany are also used in explaining our encountered relationship with the infinite. The face is the starting point of philosophy because it ushers forth the relation between the “other” and me. Since the “other” escapes one’s idea of “being,” one can never completely comprehend the face. Levinas explains, “the face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched - for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content” (“Totality and Infinity,” 194). In its refusal to be contained, fit into, or be a part of the totality, the face is an indivisible “interruption” (or rupture) to the whole. More explicitly, Levinas means that one’s encounter with a unique, separate, and infinite other limits our “self-indulgent” activities. The experience of facing reveals this separation. Levinas states, “the idea of infinity, revealed in the face, does not only require a separated being; the light of the face is necessary for separation” (“Totality and Infinity,” 151). In “To The Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” Adriaan Peperzak says it is a “conceptless experience” (118) that cannot be destroyed (since “facing” itself does not belong to things that can be created or destroyed). This infinitude that faces me denies the finite which composes the totality because the face remains completely separate and cannot be added to the whole.
According to Levinas, “the face resists possession, resists my powers. In its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total resistance to the grasp” (“Totality and Infinity,” 197). “Power” should not be understood in terms of one force opposing another force in a Hobbesian or Machiavellian framework. For Levinas, one cannot kill the other when encountering the face because one cannot reach the other through violence. Since the other cannot be transformed by me or possessed by me, killing cannot make disappear “that which cannot be subsumed.” In the face and the realization of its “radical otherness,” one does not long or desire to destroy the one encountered. Rather, one becomes aware that no dominance or mastery is possible. Levinas explains, “to kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power” (“Totality and Infinity,” 198). Levinas continues, “I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill” (“Totality and Infinity,” 198).
Peperzak further develops this point by explaining that “the other’s face (or speech) is not similar to a work or to language as structure or text or literary tradition; its infinite resistance to my powers is not a power - as if we were still in the dimension of Hobbes’s war of equal wills - but an expression that forbids and commands me ethically” (“To The Other,” 164). Levinas describes this encounter as a “non-allergic, ethical relation” of “transitivity” where the very non-violent epiphany of the face is produced (“Totality and Infinity,” 51). Hence, the face should not be understood as an opposing force to one’s own force “on the move” in the world. In contrast, it calls a living being to question “spontaneous acts of power” and violence against the other. Peperzak states, “‘face’ is the word Levinas chooses to indicate the alterity of the Other forbidding me to exercise my narcissistic violence. ‘Language’ is another expression of the same nucleus of meaning if it is understood as spoken language or discourse and not as a text detached from its author. The Other regards me and speaks to me; you are my interlocker; ‘the face speaks.’ This is the concrete way in which I am in relation with the infinite” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 64). Hence, Levinas believes that this encounter of the face is primarily concerned with not doing violence toward the other. According to Peperzak, “the face-to-face is a sincere and sober response more concerned with not doing violence than with aesthetic enjoyments. The instruction brought to me by the emergence of a face is neither a dogma nor a miracle but the initiation of a meaning” (“To The Other,” 165).
In “Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” Peperzak describes how the other’s face, in his or her looking at me, demands that I be responsible for his or her “existence, life, and behavior” (11). The other’s face is not an enemy or an impediment to be analyzed and overcome. Rather, the face is what “measures me” and demands justice (“To The Other,” 116). Levinas explains, “The idea of infinity exceeds my powers (not quantitatively, but… by calling them into question) it does not come from our a priori depths - it is consequently experience par excellence” (“Totality and Infinity,” 196). Hence, this emerges in the experience of encounter with the face. Yet, in this central claim of a call to obligation in encounter, “the other absolutely other - the Other - does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it. The relation with the other as face heals allergy. It is desire, teaching received, and the pacific opposition to discourse” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 197). Levinas explains that in welcoming the face, “the ‘resistance’ of the other does not do violence to me, does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical” (“Totality and Infinity,” 197).
The face solidifies this responsibility to the other through its proximity. Although it can never be “fully seen” (and precedes both words and deeds), the face remains present. In describing the face as a “presence” that refuses to be contained, Levinas argues that “facing” the other “presents the self” to me. In many respects, the presentation of a face can be understood as synonymous with “addressing”. In a more colloquial sense, a “given” waiting for a “giver”. Peperzak does note the ambiguity that can be associated with the concept of “addressing” since it can mean to listen, speak, provoke dedication, devotion, among other modes of interaction. Nevertheless, Peperzak asserts, “...[the] human face-to-face, is the ‘experience’ in which that relationship becomes concrete. The infinity of the other’s face, that is, its exteriority and absoluteness, its impossibility of being ranged among the phenomena of my world and of being seen as a figure against a wider background, is the only possible revelation of the infinite as described before. The word ‘face’ can be replaced by ‘expression’ or ‘word’ or ‘speech’ (la parole). Face, speech, and expression are the concrete manners by which the irreducibility of the Other comes to the fore and surprises me, disrupts my world, accuses, and refuses my egoism” (“To The Other,” 142). Ultimately, for Levinas, “the epiphany of infinity is expression and discourse” (“Totality and Infinity,” 200) and “the epiphany of the face is ethical” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 199).
In this disruption that demands a level of physical “proximity,” the other remains “infinitely transcendent”. Levinas states, “the Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our existence. Speech proceeds from absolute difference” (“Totality and Infinity,” 194). Levinas claims that “better than comprehension, discourse relates with what remains essentially transcendent” (“Totality and Infinity,” 195). This means that the formal work of language “consists in presenting the transcendent” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 195). By transcendent, Levinas is referring to that which is: (1) Not an element of what can be seen, touched, grasped, or any elements of the world, yet (2) touches or reaches the other which does not belong to my world. Therefore, once again, the “other” must be understood as that which pierces, breaks, and interrupts my world. For Levinas, if we look at someone, we come to see the person as a “unique fact” that cannot be changed, replaced, or ignored. Although not advocating a “human rights theory,” every person has “rights”. Furthermore, Levinas reverses the traditional notion of altruism by claiming that respect for the self comes out of respect for others. For Levinas, in the face we are made aware that all humans deserve the same level of respect regardless of their social status in the world. One must be responsible for you and the “other beyond you” (responsible for other’s other). One cannot “place” you when you speak or make you fit among the things that compose the totality. This is because “speaking” is not finite, an entity, an element, or just a part of the totality.
The face “breaks through” the form because it is unique and separate from any constructed system. The form delimits all the aspects that make up the specificity of a being [an idea, ousia, essence, way of being of a thing, shape taken, etc.]. For Levinas, one is never identical with any descriptive aspect of a person since one cannot be completely identified with what one does, thinks, feels, or desires. Hence, the face is said to “break through” form. The other becomes “concrete” in the face and through speech. An extraordinary relation emerges when another looks at me and speaks to me. Peperzak explains that “Levinas shows how the extraordinary relation opened by another’s looking at me and speaking to me causes discontinuity of the encompassing world and context that is common to us... Ego’s autonomy is shocked and put into question” (“To The Other,” 164). Levinas states, “…the idea of infinity, far from violating the mind, conditions nonviolence itself, that is, establishes ethics. The other is not for reason a scandal… but the first teaching. A being receiving the idea of Infinity, receiving since it cannot derive it from itself, is being taught in a non-maieutic fashion, a being whose very existing consists in this incessant reception of teaching in this incessant overflowing of self (which is time). To think is to have the idea of infinity, or to be taught. Rational thought refers to this teaching” (“Totality and Infinity,” 204). Levinas believes that this confrontation with the face presupposes that the other is an “end” in itself. He writes, “the face is a living presence; it is expression. The life of expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby dissimulated. The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse... He at each moment undoes the form he presents” (“Totality and Infinity,” 66). In the appearance of the other, one’s “monopoly of the world” is rejected as infinite obligations of the self “to the other” emerges. “The other is… the first rational teaching, the condition for all teaching” (Levinas, “Totality and Infinity,” 203). The face forces one to question one’s egocentric, autonomous paradigm and demands that one submit to the needs of another.
This is why Levinas starts his analysis of one’s relationship to the face under the mode of separation. Levinas’ view can be understood as a claim that stands opposed to Hegel’s privilege of the “unity in relationship” in his discussion about it as all part of the same genus (homogenous source of difference). The “approaching” of the other is different from all other relationships because proximity cannot be possessed or mastered. For Levinas, the face forces one to reject the premise that all individuals are part of a project of the general whole. He argues that the self remains distinct in its obligation to be responsible for the other. Levinas is rejecting modern conceptions of the self which attempt to appropriate or integrate all things into the ego as a “master/possessor/owner” of “nature/universe”. He refuses to embrace the idea of the self as all-encompassing and conscious of the entirety. Levinas wants to show a more “primordial principle” about what it means to be human. This epiphany reveals that the “I” exists for the other and one’s entire being or “task” must be oriented toward the other. One’s entrance to the other’s world brings with it an inherent “responsibility”. This acknowledgment of my responsibility to the other is an appeal without properties. For example, this appeal is not a response to the beauty (or some specific quality) of the Other. According to Levinas, “the thematization of a face undoes the face and undoes the approach. The mode in which a face indicates its own absence in my responsibility requires a description that can be formed only in ethical language” (“Otherwise Than Being,” 94). In this encounter, people speak, look at me, and have a face. Levinas believes that this encounter is self-evident. If you do not see it, in a colloquial sense, you are a potential murderer. The first unspoken, self-evident word was “thou shall not kill.” For Levinas, there is no way to “prove” this premise. One’s eyes make it clear to me that if I kill you, I am the one who loses.
This insertion of the other demands a response: “To encounter another is to discover that I am under a basic obligation: the human Other’s infinity reveals itself as a command: the fact of the Other’s ‘epiphany’ reveals that I am his or her servant” (Peperzak, “Beyond,” 5). This experience with the other revealed in both the “revelation of the face” and the “absoluteness of speaking” demands that one listen. “Thematization” makes it disappear. Levinas starts with the recognition of the brute fact that we are talking to each other. Therefore, the question is not: How can I (as conscious) talk to the other? Rather, the question is: What structure of our talking to each other are we communicating? This is the only appropriate attitude toward the other in this encounter because the face demands “generosity, donation” (Peperzak, “To The Other,” 142). Levinas explains, “This is positively produced as the possession of a world I can bestow as a gift on the Other - that is, as a presence before a face. For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands... The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name the face” (“Totality and Infinity,” 50).
Paradoxically, the face can be understood as both a concrete and infinite demand for a response of generosity. In a world that is common to us, the face of the other manifesting itself presents a moment of “epiphany.” For Levinas, the face emerges as a mission in which one does not experience “self” as “self”, but as self-given to self. It is a task given to me as the one who has to serve the other. In a general sense, Levinas is arguing that you cannot walk away from what you are (always for others). It is also important to note, therefore, that one must work to ensure that one’s own self-existence (physical health) does not degenerate in a way that makes one is incapable of “being for the other”. This task is a duty that one has to fulfill.
Ultimately, in the face we see the other for whom we are responsible. Levinas states, “the face of a neighbor signifies for me an unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract. It escapes representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality” (“Otherwise Than Being,” 88). Therefore, the face is both a “fact” revealing the other and a “command” toward the other. It is the infinite which opens the world to the other in its indivisibility and its refusal to be contained or destroyed. Through this interruption of the totality, we are called to be responsible to the other. Simply put, in this way “the good” is present in so far as people help others. This simultaneously reveals that our reason inherently points to something that is beyond itself. For Levinas, when we encounter a person on the street, one already knows what one has to do. This innate calling of responsibility is the ultimate foundation of human life which is discovered at the moment one looks at a fellow human person in proximity. The face calls us to a responsible relationship with the other. In sum, “the face ‘is’ and ‘shows’ its imperative, obligating character. The answer to the question “What is the face? (or ‘What does it disclose?’) is: ‘The face obligates me; it reveals that I am already devoted to the one who looks at me; I am responsible for you” (Peperzak, “Beyond,” 222).